By Mike Gaddy

ANTI-FEDERALISTS: WHO WERE THEY AND HOW DID THEY KNOW?

Unfortunately for those who opposed the ratification of the Constitution of 1787, they were referred to as the polar opposite of what they actually stood for. As discussed in a previous lesson, these men, and a woman, (perhaps women) were very much opposed to the nationalistic government which would be created with the constitution and instead supported a true federated republic in which the states would control a central government established for certain extremely limited purposes instead of a strong central government which would control the states and allow their existence only as long as they were “subordinately useful” as stated by James Madison.

The Anti-Federalists, unlike the Federalists who were all members of the wealthy aristocracy, came from all segments of society in 1787-88. The citizen farmer was as much a part of this group as was the wealthy planters like George Mason and Richard Henry Lee. Also among them were the wealthy and well born such as Patrick Henry, Robert Yates and John Lansing Jr., who were also lawyers. But, to take all of their writings and cast them into one heap without a complete examination of their individual but sometimes collective points is doing a great disservice to our own history. There must be a reason for the fact that for over 100 years these Anti-Federalists were left out of books and academic studies on the founding of this country. Something is usually hidden to keep people from seeing something, truth perhaps?

We will certainly do a deep dive into the objections of all of those mentioned above who seriously opposed ratification of the constitution, but I would like to start with a dissection of the work of an Anti-Federalist who was unknown but wrote with an acerbic sarcasm not at all common in the writing of others of the same mind.

We will begin our exploration of these men and woman of Liberty with a person called “Montezuma” who was regarded as a Pennsylvanian and wrote this essay which appeared in the Independent Gazetteer on October 17, 1787.

(I will add comments after each paragraph in block while the writings of Montezuma will be in italics. For clarity, Montezuma writes as one of the “Aristocratic Party”–Federalists.)

We the Aristocratic party of the United States, lamenting the many inconveniences to which the late confederation subjected the well-born, the better kind of people, bringing them down to the level of the rabble-and holding in utter detestation that frontispiece to every bill of rights, “that all men are born equal”-beg leave (for the purpose of drawing a line between such as we think were ordained to govern, and such as were made to bear the weight of government without having any share in its administration) to submit to our Friends in the first class for their inspection, the following defense of our monarchical, aristocratical democracy.

What an eloquent description of those who were present at the convention; “The aristocratic party of the United States!” Montezuma here alludes to the fact the Federalists’ disdain for the Articles was because those under that form of government were equal and thus was bringing the aristocracy down to the level of the common person. The author then moves to the purpose of the constitution proposed by this aristocracy: “to draw a line between themselves” and those Washington had written had a right to “impose their imperial dignity.” And here is the classic line in my opinion: “such as were made to bear the weight of government without having and share in its administration.” If this is not a perfect description of the form of government which enslaves us today, such a description does not exist.

lst. As a majority of all societies consist of men who (though totally incapable of thinking or acting in governmental matters) are more readily led than driven, we have thought meet to indulge them in something like a democracy in the new constitution, which part we have designated by the popular name of the House of Representatives. But to guard against every possible danger from this lower house, we have subjected every bill they bring forward, to the double negative of our upper house and president. Nor have we allowed the populace the right to elect their representatives annually . . . lest this body should be too much under the influence and control of their constituents, and thereby prove the “weatherboard of our grand edifice, to show the shiftings of every fashionable gale,”-for we have not yet to learn that little else is wanting to aristocratize the most democratical representative than to make him somewhat independent of his political creators. We have taken away that rotation of appointment which has so long perplexed us-that grand engine of popular influence. Every man is eligible into our government from time to time for life. This will have a two-fold good effect. First, it prevents the representatives from mixing with the lower class, and imbibing their foolish sentiments, with which they would have come charged on re-election.

Wow, what a paragraph, where to start? First, the author points out that those elected by the people at the time, the House of Representatives, could be overruled by the Senate and the executive. “Rotation of appointments” was the 1787 language for what is termed today, term limits. Montezuma then expands on his thesis that this was designed to remove the people’s will from the machinations of government as much as possible. He then predicts what I believe is the greatest calamity to befall the people of this country and that is the career politician. How could Montezuma look into the future and see Nancy Pelosi, Teddy Kennedy, Chuck Schumer, Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, Bob Dole and countless others. The damage these career politicians have been able to bring to our Freedoms is incredible and the wealth they have been able to accumulate during that time is unfathomable.

2d. They will from the perpetuality of office be under our eye, and in a short time will think and act like us, independently of popular whims and prejudices. For the assertion “that evil communications corrupt good manners,” is not more true than its reverse. We have allowed this house the power to impeach, but we have tenaciously reserved the right to try. We hope gentlemen, you will see the policy of this clause-for what matters it who accuses, if the accused is tried by his friends. In fine, this plebian house will have little power, and that little be rightly shaped by our house of gentlemen, who will have a very extensive influence-from their being chosen out of the genteeler class … It is true, every third senatorial seat is to be vacated duennually, but two-thirds of this influential body will remain in office, and be ready to direct or (if necessary) bring over to the good old way, the young members, if the old ones should not be returned. And whereas many of our brethren, from a laudable desire to support their rank in life above the commonalty, have not only deranged their finances, but subjected their persons to indecent treatment (as being arrested for debt, etc.) we have framed a privilege clause, by which they may laugh at the fools who trusted them. But we have given out, that this clause was provided, only that the members might be able without interruption, to deliberate on the important business of their country.

Here Montezuma touches on impeachment of which Thomas Jefferson said was “but a scarecrow.” How absolutely absurd is the idea that those who commit political crimes are to only be tried by their partners in crime. No other absurdity of this constitution has done more to polarize the people into party affiliation and devotion than impeachment. Just imagine if you will a gang member in Chicago, or any other city, who has committed a crime but the law says he can only be tried by fellow gang members. Then the Anti-Federalist author fully illustrates the fact that every election cycle only one third of the Senate is replaced, leaving intact a majority who cling to the policies of old.

We have frequently endeavored to effect in our respective states, the happy discrimination which pervades this system; but finding we could not bring the states into it individually, we have determined … and have taken pains to leave the legislature of each free and independent state, as they now call themselves, in such a situation that they will eventually be absorbed by our grand continental vortex, or dwindle into petty corporations, and have power over little else than yoaking hogs or determining the width of cart wheels. But (aware that an intention to annihilate state legislatures, would be objected to our favorite scheme) we have made their existence (as a board of electors) necessary to ours. This furnishes us and our advocates with a fine answer to any clamors that may be raised on this subject. We have so interwoven continental and state legislatures that they cannot exist separately; whereas we in truth only leave them the power of electing us, for what can a provincial legislature do when we possess the exclusive regulation of external and internal commerce, excise, duties, imposts, post-offices and roads; when we and we alone, have the power to wage war, make peace, coin money (if we can get bullion) if not, borrow money, organize the militia and call them forth to execute our decrees, and crush insurrections assisted by a noble body of veterans subject to our nod, which we have the power of raising and keeping even in the time of peace. What have we to fear from state legislatures or even from states, when we are armed with such powers, with a president at our head? (A name we thought proper to adopt in conformity to the prejudices of a silly people who are so foolishly fond of a Republican government, that we were obliged to accommodate in names and forms to them, in order more effectually to secure the substance of our proposed plan; but we all know that Cromwell was a King, with the title of Protector). I repeat it, what have we to fear armed with such powers, with a president at our head who is captain- -general of the army, navy and militia of the United States, who can make and unmake treaties, appoint and commission ambassadors and other ministers, who can grant or refuse reprieves or pardons, who can make judges of the supreme and other continental courts-in short, who will be the source, the fountain of honor, profit and power, whose influence like the rays of the sun, will diffuse itself far and wide, will exhale all democratical vapors and break the clouds of popular insurrection? But again gentlemen, our judicial power is a strong work, a masked battery, few people see the guns we can and will ere long play off from it. For the judicial power embraces every question which can arise in law or equity, under this constitution and under the laws of “the United States” (which laws will be, you know, the supreme laws of the land). This power extends to all cases, affecting ambassadors or other public ministers, “and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.”

In this paragraph, Montezuma dismantles any thought one might have of the power of the individual states and then exposes the ultimate power of the courts which would very quickly, under Federalist John Marshall’s court, come to dominate the government and the people and eventually create law out of whole cloth.

Now, can a question arise in the colonial courts, which the ingenuity or sophistry of an able lawyer may not bring within one or other of the above cases? Certainly not. Then our court will have original or appellate jurisdiction in all cases-and if so, how fallen are state judicatures-and must not every provincial law yield to our supreme flat? Our constitution answers yes. . . . And finally we shall entrench ourselves so as to laugh at the cabals of the commonalty. A few regiments will do at first; it must be spread abroad that they are absolutely necessary to defend the frontiers. Now a regiment and then a legion must be added quietly; by and by a frigate or two must be built, still taking care to intimate that they are essential to the support of our revenue laws and to prevent smuggling. We have said nothing about a bill of rights, for we viewed it as an eternal clog upon our designs, as a lock chain to the wheels of government-though, by the way, as we have not insisted on rotation in our offices, the simile of a wheel is ill. We have for some time considered the freedom of the press as a great evil-it spreads information, and begets a licentiousness in the people which needs the rein more than the spur; besides, a daring printer may expose the plans of government and lessen the consequence of our president and senate-for these and many other reasons we have said nothing with respect to the “right of the people to speak and publish their sentiments” or about their “palladiums of liberty” and such stuff. We do not much like that sturdy privilege of the people-the right to demand the writ of habeas corpus. We have therefore reserved the power of refusing it in cases of rebellion, and you know we are the judges of what is rebellion…. Our friends we find have been assiduous in representing our federal calamities, until at length the people at large-frightened by the gloomy picture on one side, and allured by the prophecies of some of our fanciful and visionary adherents on the other-are ready to accept and confirm our proposed government without the delay or forms of examination–which was the more to be wished, as they are wholly unfit to investigate the principles or pronounce on the merit of so exquisite a system.

There is so very much in the above paragraph; the mention of the Bill of Rights which the Federalists fought so hard to keep from being included in the original constitution but quickly realized that all hopes of ratification in the key states of Virginia and New York depended on the promise of a Bill of Rights. Though over 100 different suggestions for the Bill of Rights were submitted to the first Congress which was in the majority control of the Federalists who had composed the original document, only a bare minimum were allowed to be presented with much of the wording in those amendments watered down or altered as to make them effectively nugatory before the federal courts.

Impressed with a conviction that this constitution is calculated to restrain the influence and power of the LOWER CLASS-to draw that discrimination we have so long sought after; to secure to our friends privileges and offices, which were not to be … [obtained] under the former government, because they were in common; to take the burden of legislation and attendance on public business off the commonalty, who will be much better able thereby to prosecute with effect their private business; to destroy that political thirteen headed monster, the state sovereignties; to check the licentiousness of the people by making it dangerous to speak or publish daring or tumultuary sentiments; to enforce obedience to laws by a strong executive, aided by military pensioners; and finally to promote the public and private interests of the better kind of people-we submit it to your judgment to take such measures for its adoption as you in your wisdom may think fit.

Absolutely nothing to be added to the above paragraph. Here, as we will see throughout the studies of the works of the Anti-Federalists, there existed a wisdom to predict exactly how the government under the constitution of 1787 would be used by the wealthy aristocracy to enslave and control the masses. Again, the Federalists “promised’ and the Anti-Federalists “predicted.” THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE RIGHT!